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This paper develops an economic model of criminal enforcement that com-
bines the goals of deterrence and incapacitation. Potential offenders commit an
initial criminal act if the present value of net private gains is positive. A fraction
of these offenders become habitual and commit further crimes immediately upon
release from their initial prison term (if any). The optimal punishment scheme in
this setting generally involves a finite prison term for first-time offenders (based on
the goal of deterrence), and an infinite (life) sentence for repeat offenders (based
on the goal of incapacitation).
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Deterrence, Incapacitation, and Repeat Offenders 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 The economic model of crime beginning with Becker (1968) has been almost 
exclusively concerned with policies aimed at achieving optimal deterrence.1  While this 
approach has led to many important insights, it also leaves unexplained certain features of 
actual penalty structures.  Most notably, the theory’s prediction that prison should never 
be imposed until an offender’s wealth is exhausted through fines seems clearly 
inconsistent with practice.  In the case of non-violent offenders, the apparently 
“excessive” use of prison is likely an effort to pursue a policy of equal treatment of rich 
and poor defendants, but in cases involving violent offenders, prison is almost certainly 
imposed, at least in part, for incapacitation purposes.  Indeed, this seems to be the 
primary justification for “three strikes” laws, which impose life sentences on offenders 
deemed to be habitual. 
 In comparison to deterrence, however, the economic literature on the 
incapacitation function of imprisonment is scant.  A notable exception is Shavell (1987),2 
who shows that if an offender is expected to impose more harm on society than the cost 
of imprisoning him, then he should be kept in prison for as long as that is true, possibly 
for the remainder of his life.  This does not account, however, for the policy of imposing 
less than maximal sanctions for first and second offenses. This paper seeks to address that 
shortcoming by developing a model that combines the goals of deterrence and 
incapacitation.  Specifically, it assumes that all offenders are deterrable on their first 
offense, but once they have committed an initial crime, some become “habitual” (i.e., 
                                                 
1
 See, for example, the surveys by Polinsky and Shavell (2000, 2007). 
2
 Also see Ehrlich (1981), Levitt (1998), and Kessler and Levitt (1999). 
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undeterrable), while the remainder are strictly one-timers (i.e., will commit no further 
crimes).  In this setting, repeat offenders should be imprisoned for life based on the goal 
of incapacitation (the “third strike”), whereas first-timers should generally receive 
positive but less than maximal sentences to reflect the usual trade-off between the gains 
from deterrence and the cost of imprisonment. 
 In consequence of this increasing sanction policy, the paper also contributes to the 
growing literature on the optimal punishment of repeat offenders.  In practice, most 
criminal penalty structures involve increasing sanctions for repeat offenders, but standard 
deterrence models have had surprising difficulty in explaining this policy.  The simple 
reason is that, if an optimal sanction achieves the first-best level of deterrence—that is, if 
it succeeds in deterring only those offenders who value the crime less than its cost to 
society—then an increasing sanction for repeat offenses would be undesirable because it 
would overdeter those individuals.  Thus, deterrence models can only show that an 
increasing sanction is optimal if there is some initial underdeterrence, but the literature 
has an ad hoc quality to it.3  Combining incapacitation with deterrence in the manner 
described above, however, provides a natural explanation for a policy of increasing 
sanctions.4  
 Finally, because of the emphasis on incapacitation, the model explicitly 
incorporates time in a way that most models of crime do not.  In particular, it assumes 
that offenders, once they choose to commit a criminal act, continue to do so until 
apprehended, where the time until apprehension is modeled as a random variable with 
                                                 
3
 See, for example, Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1991), Polinsky and Shavell (1998), Chu, Hu and Huang 
(2000), Emons (2003), and Miceli and Bucci (2005).  
4
 Polnsky and Shavell (2007, p. 439) note that incapacitation can justify increasing sanctions if repeat 
offenders have a higher propensity to commit crimes, but they do not suggest the possibility that deterrence 
and incapacitation together can explain the policy. 
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expected value equal to the inverse of the instantaneous probability of apprehension.  The 
model is essentially a continuous version of the approach used in Shavell’s (1987) 
incapacitation model.  The only deterrence model to use such an approach is Davis 
(1988), though he examines a different issue. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 sets up the model.  
Section 3 then examines the pure incapacitation model, where a fraction of offenders are 
habitual and the remaining fraction are one-timers.  In this context the optimal policy is 
as follows: imprison repeat offenders for life, and either release first-timers immediately 
or imprison them for life (in which case there obviously are no repeaters).  Section 4 then 
develops a hybrid model in which first time offenders can be deterred, but of those who 
commit an offense, a fraction become habitual.  The optimal policy in this case continues 
to involve a life sentence for repeat offenders, but generally involves a finite term for first 
timers based on optimal deterrence.  Finally, Section 5 draws conclusions. 
 
2. Set up of the Model 
 Offenders contemplate the commission of an illegal act that yields them a private 
gain of g, and imposes a social harm of h, each measured per unit of time until 
apprehension.  We treat h as fixed,5 but assume g is a random draw from the distribution 
function Z(g) with density z(g).  Potential offenders begin committing crimes if, after 
drawing g, the present value of their lifetime gains exceed the present value of expected 
punishment costs.  Potential offenders know that, once they begin committing crimes, 
                                                 
5
 Shavell (1987) allows h to vary across offenders, or to decline with the offender’s age.  The first 
possibility implies that some offenders should never be jailed for incapacitation purposes, and the second 
implies that those who are jailed should be released when the harm they would cause falls below the cost of 
imprisonment.  We ignore both of these possibilities to keep the model simple. 
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they will be caught with (fixed) probability p at each instant, and if apprehended, 
imprisoned for a term of s1.6   
When released (assuming s1 is finite), offenders will either be reformed and never 
commit crimes again, or they will be habitual. Let θ be the probability that an offender is 
habitual on release.  Habitual offenders will begin committing crimes immediately upon 
release and will continue to do so in any future periods that they are not imprisoned for 
the remainder of their infinite lifetime. The per-period private gain from these crimes 
continues to be g (the realized gain from the initial crime), though the offender no longer 
engages in a cost-benefit calculation before committing them.  (These gains will, 
however, enter the offender’s calculation of the present value of future gains from 
committing the first offense.)  The probability of apprehension is assumed to be the same 
for first-time and repeat offenders (p), but the prison terms, s2, s3,…, can be different for 
repeat offenders, given that, on apprehension, an offender’s past criminal record is 
observable. 
     Let the social cost of imprisonment (not counting the offender’s disutility) be c 
per unit of time that the offender is imprisoned, which we assume remains constant 
throughout the term of imprisonment.  Further, we assume that 
  h  > c,         (1) 
which says that the cost per unit of time that an offender is free, consisting of the harm he 
imposes, exceeds the unit cost of imprisonment.  This reflects the potential social benefits 
of incapacitation for habitual offenders (Shavell, 1987).      
                                                 
6
 To keep the model simple, we consider only imprisonment.  One could easily imagine, however, a policy 
of imposing a fine on first-time offenders for deterrence purposes and then imprisoning repeat offenders for 
incapacitation. 
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 The apprehension technology is modeled as follows.  Time is continuous and, as 
noted, the instantaneous probability of apprehension is p.7  Thus, the time until 
apprehension, t, is a random variable with distribution  
  f(t) = pe–pt,        (2) 
and expected time to apprehension equal to 1/p.8  Finally, because offenders are 
infinitely-lived, gains and losses are discounted at the instantaneous rate r, which is the 
same for offenders and society.  Figure 1 summarizes the structure of the model. 
 
3. Pure Incapacitation 
 We begin by considering the optimal structure of penalties in a pure 
incapacitation model.  Thus, we assume that there are a fixed number of offenders 
(normalized to be one), each of whom commits an initial crime with certainty.  Of these 
offenders, a fraction θ are habitual and resume committing crimes immediately upon 
release from prison, while the remainder commit no further crime upon release.  In terms 
of Figure 1, we begin at the decision node where Nature chooses the proportion of 
habitual and one-time offenders.  The dashed line connecting the two branches of the tree 
indicates that the enforcer cannot distinguish between habitual and one-time offenders 
following the first offense. 
 Consider first the optimal punishment of a repeat offender.  Since a repeat 
offender reveals himself with certainty to be habitual, the optimal prison term is clearly 
infinite since, given (1), the cost of imprisonment per unit of time is less than the cost of 
                                                 
7
 In contrast, Shavell’s (1987) model of incapacitation treats time as discrete. 
8
 Mortensen (1983) and Loury (1979) use a similar technology in modeling the race for a patent.  Davis 
(1988) is the only other model of criminal enforcement to use this apprehension technology, though his 
paper addresses a very different question.  
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harm for habitual offenders (Shavell, 1987).  Thus, s2 is infinite. This policy reflects the 
logic of three-strikes laws, which impose life sentences on repeat offenders for certain 
particularly harmful crimes. 
 Our focus in the remainder of this section will be on the optimal prison term for 
first-time offenders, s1.  To derive this we need to calculate the present value of social 
costs imposed by first timers.  (In this section, we ignore the private gains to offenders as 
well as their disutility of imprisonment.  These factors will be incorporated in the 
deterrence model below.)  Consider first the cost imposed on society by a repeat 
(habitual) offender once he is released from prison after his first offense.  Given that he 
will commit crimes until he is apprehended at time t, and then will be imprisoned for the 
remainder of his infinite life, we have 
  ∫∫
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This expression represents the expected cost imposed by habitual offenders from their 
release date forward.  
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 Now move back to the initial apprehension of a first-time offender who may or 
may not be habitual. The initial prison term of length s1 entails a social cost, calculated as 
of the date of apprehension, equal to 
  ∫
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Now weight (4) by θ (the probability that the offender is habitual), discount it back to the 
apprehension date, and add the result to (5) to get 
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The final step is to account for the cost imposed by the first-time offender before 
apprehension.  Proceeding as above, we first obtain the present value of costs imposed by 
the first-timer up to the date of apprehension, t: 
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Now discount (6) back to time zero and add it to (7) to get 
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Finally, integrate (8) over all t, weighted by the density function in (2): 
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This expression represents the present value of social costs imposed by a first-time 
offender who, with probability θ, is habitual and hence, if re-apprehended, is imprisoned 
for life.   
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 The social problem from the perspective of incapacitation is to choose the initial 
prison term, s1, to minimize (9).  Note that this is equivalent to minimizing C*(s1).  Thus, 
taking the derivative of (6) yields 
  
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The optimal prison term is thus a corner solution, depending on the sign of the term in 
square brackets.9  If this term is positive, s1*=0, meaning that the first-time offender 
should be released immediately upon apprehension.  This will be true if the following 
condition holds: 
  *
)( θθ ≡
+
+
<
pcrh
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,       (11) 
where the critical value, θ*, is strictly less than one given (1).  In contrast, if θ>θ*, first-
time offenders should be imprisoned for life.  Intuitively, first-time offenders should be 
released immediately if the probability that they are habitual is less than a critical value; 
otherwise, they should be imprisoned for life. 
 The foregoing analysis provides a natural explanation, based on the goal of 
incapacitation, for life imprisonment for dangerous offenders.  It also suggests why first-
time and repeat offenders should perhaps be treated differently.  It does not, however, 
explain positive but less than maximal punishments for first-timers. The next section 
seeks to address this deficiency by introducing deterrence as an additional social goal.   
 
4. Introducing Deterrence: A Hybrid Model 
4.1. The Offender’s Problem 
                                                 
9
 This is a consequence of the assumption that both h and c are constants. 
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 We now suppose that all potential offenders make a rational decision about 
whether or not to commit an initial crime.  As in the standard deterrence model (Polinsky 
and Shavell, 2000, 2007), the offender compares the gain from committing the offense to 
the expected cost.   The current model differs from the standard model, however, in its 
explicit introduction of time. Thus, as noted above, the gain, g, is measured per unit of 
time.  Likewise, the cost of imprisonment to the offender, δ, is also measured per unit of 
time,10 and both are discounted by the rate r.   Moreover, the offender, on making his 
initial commission decision, takes account of the chance that he will become habitual 
after the first offense, and hence may face life imprisonment for a future offense.   
 In calculating the potential first-time offender’s overall gain from committing a 
crime, we proceed as above and first consider the net gains to an offender who becomes 
habitual upon release from the initial prison term of s1.  Given a time to apprehension of t 
for the second offense, after which he will be imprisoned for life on incapacitation 
grounds,11 we obtain  
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Now integrate over all t, weighted by the density function in (2): 
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 The social cost of imprisonment per unit of time is therefore c+δ. 
11
 We take the above policy prescription as given, due to the requirement of time consistency.  That is, 
since habitual offenders cannot be deterred, only the incapacitation benefits exist and the optimal term, as 
argued above, is infinite.  Of course, there are potential deterrence benefits from s2 (and so on) in terms of 
its effect on the offender’s decision to commit the first offense (what Shepherd (2002) calls “full 
deterrence”), but any deterrence gains can be achieved by the appropriate choice of s1. 
 10 
Although this expression may be positive or negative, the sign does not matter for the 
habitual offender’s behavior because he is, by assumption, not a rational calculator.  It 
will, however, affect a potential offender’s decision about whether or not to commit his 
first crime since he knows that there is a chance he will become habitual.  We turn to that 
decision now.  
 If a potential offender commits a crime for the first time, he is apprehended after t 
periods, serves a prison term of length s1, and then, with probability θ, immediately 
begins committing further crimes, resulting in a net gain (or loss) given by (13).  For a 
given t, the resulting net return is 
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After integrating over all t, weighted by the density in (2), we obtain the offender’s 
present value of net expected gains from committing the initial crime: 
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A potential first-time offender will commit a crime if and only if G(s1)>0.  It is possible 
to re-arrange (15) to show that G>0 if and only if g>g*(s1), where ∂g*/∂s1>0. (See the 
Appendix for details.)  Thus, an increase in the prison term for a first offense has a 
deterring effect. 
4.2. The Social Optimum 
  We can now combine the present value of social costs (harm plus punishment) in 
(9) with the offender’s private net gains in (15) to write social welfare as 
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where k(p) is the (fixed) cost of apprehension.12 We make the conventional assumption 
here of counting the gains of offenders as part of social welfare.  Although this 
assumption is perhaps less justified than usual given that the current model is exclusively 
concerned with dangerous crimes, the formulation in (16) allows an easier comparison 
with the standard model of deterrence.  As will be shown below, if the offender’s gains 
were excluded, the optimum would generally involve greater (perhaps complete) 
deterrence. 
 Taking the derivative of (16) with respect to s1 yields 
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where G=0 in the first term given that g=g*(s1) for the marginal offender (i.e., the latter 
is indifferent between committing and not committing the crime).  The first term in (17) 
is positive, reflecting the present value of savings from deterring an additional criminal 
act. However, the second term, which reflects the marginal effect of an increase in s1 on 
net gains, is ambiguous in sign.  First, consider the sign of G'. Taking the derivative of 
(15) with respect to s1 and rearranging yields 
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which reflects the decrease in lifetime benefits of offenders resulting from a longer prison 
term.  This includes both the increasing cost of imprisonment and the foregone gains 
from future crimes if the offender turns out to be habitual.  As for the sign of TC', the 
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 Note that the disutility of prison for offenders is contained in G(s1), while the cost to society is contained 
in TC(s1).  
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analysis of the pure incapacitation model showed that it  can be either positive or 
negative, depending on the magnitude of θ, the fraction of habitual offenders, relative to 
the critical value, θ*.   
 Consider first the special case where θ=0; that is, where all offenders are one-
timers.  This corresponds to the pure deterrence model of crime.  In this case, TC′>0 and 
(17) reduces to 
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Thus, the second term is unambiguously negative.  Assuming an interior solution, this 
yields the following first order condition for s1*: 
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which says that the marginal deterrence benefits from an increase in s1 (the left-hand 
side) should be set equal to the marginal cost (the right-hand side).  Note that this 
condition is virtually identical to the condition for the optimal non-monetary sanction 
derived by Polinsky and Shavell (2007) in the context of the standard deterrence model.  
(The only difference is that here, the expected savings in punishment costs from deterring 
one more crime on the left-hand side is in present value terms.)13  Thus, the hybrid model 
contains the standard deterrence model as a special case. 
 Now suppose that θ>0, so some offenders are habitual.  If, first of all, θ<θ*, 
TC'>0, so the right-hand side of (17) is again negative.  In this case, the outcome is 
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 Also, in the version of their model in which they assume p is fixed, they set p=1 (i.e., apprehension is 
certain). 
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qualitatively equivalent to the pure deterrence model.  That is, an interior solution for s1 
will generally be optimal.  The only difference is the magnitude of the marginal cost of 
increasing s1.   
In contrast, if θ>θ*, TC'<0.  Recall that this is the case where s1 is infinite 
according to the pure incapacitation model.  A finite s1 is nevertheless still possible in the 
hybrid model if the second term in (17) is negative, meaning that there is still a positive 
marginal cost of increasing s1.  To illustrate, consider the extreme situation where θ=1 
(i.e., all offenders are habitual).  In this case, it is easy to show that 
  G'(s1) – TC'(s1) = )()( 2
1
gch
rp
pre rs
−−
+
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.    (20) 
Generally, the sign of this expression, when summed over g>g*(s1), is ambiguous.  The 
offsetting effects are as follows.  First, the fact that h>c by assumption tends to make (20) 
positive.  This works in the direction of an infinite value for s1 according to the logic of 
the pure incapacitation model.  That is, because all offenders are habitual, and because 
the harm they cause exceeds the cost of incarcerating them, they should be imprisoned 
for life for their first offense.  In this case, the net incapacitation benefits of prison 
(captured by the second term in (17)) reinforces their deterrent benefits (the first term), 
resulting in an infinite sentence.   
 Offsetting this is the –g term in (20), which will make the second term in (17) 
negative if there is enough weight in the upper tail of the distribution of offender gains. 
This effect, if strong enough, limits the optimal prison term.  Intuitively, if the reduction 
in the expected net gain to offenders from an increase in s1 is strong enough (owing to a 
reduction in the amount of time they have to commit future crimes), it can outweigh the 
gain to society from avoiding the net harm from crime.  Obviously, this effect depends 
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entirely on the decision to include the offenders’ gains in the social welfare function.  If 
G were not included in W, the second term in (17) would depend only on the sign of TC', 
which is negative whenever θ>θ*.  In this case, an infinite s1 would be optimal; that is, 
deterrence and incapacitation reinforce each other. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 The standard economic model of crime based on optimal deterrence justifies the 
use of prison as a kind of last resort, to be reserved for those cases where offenders’ 
wealth is insufficient to provide adequate deterrence by means of a fine.  Actual practice 
seems clearly inconsistent with this prescription.  One obvious explanation is that prison 
is used to incapacitate offenders deemed to impose more harm on society than the cost of 
imprisoning them.  The problem, of course, is that habitual offenders cannot generally be 
identified after a first offense, so a policy of punishing all first-timers as if they were 
habitual is deemed unduly harsh.  In addition, a substantially shorter prison term is 
sufficient to deter many offenders from committing crimes in the first place, thereby 
preventing them from embarking on a life of crime.  These insights suggest that a model 
combining both deterrence and incapacitation might be able to explain the common 
practice of imposing relatively short sentences for first-timers (based primarily on 
deterrence), and lengthy sentences for repeat offenders (based on incapacitation).  The 
model in this paper represents a first effort to develop such a hybrid model.         
 In order to achieve this goal, the model explicitly introduced time in a way that 
most models of crime have not, but which captures some realistic aspects of the 
apprehension process.  To keep the analysis tractable, the model also made several 
 15 
simplifying assumptions.  For instance, it focused exclusively on prison, and it treated the 
probability of apprehension as fixed.  Extensions of the model would therefore relax 
these assumptions.  Still, the model represents a useful step in the direction of explaining 
actual punishment policies within a coherent economic framework.  
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Appendix 
 
 The expression for G(s1) in (15) can be rearranged as follows: 
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Thus, G>0 if and only if g>g*(s1), where 
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Note that, since the numerator of the parenthetic term is increasing in s1 while the 
denominator is decreasing in s1, ∂g*/∂s1>0, as asserted in the text. In the special case 
where θ =0 (the pure deterrence model), (A1) reduces to  
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